Norwich City 1992/93
In the Premier League’s history there are some rarely told stories, and the story of Norwich in the 1992/93 season can be included in that. Norwich had only avoided relegation on the last day of the previous season and had the considerable odds of 250/1 to win the Premier League crown in its inaugural season. In addition to this, they sold star player Robert Fleck in the summer, which seemingly left Norwich severely lacking in quality going forward. The £800,000 signing of Mark Robins to replace the void left by Fleck was uninspiring for many Norwich fans at first, but his impact was staggering and integral to their overall success.
Alongside this, there was uncertainty surrounding the managerial position at the club after Dave Stringer had prematurely resigned at the end of the 1991/1992 season. In a surprising turn of events, Norwich turned to reserve team coach Mike Walker. Walker’s managerial experience was extremely limited, and his style of play seemingly didn’t fit the accepted style of physicality and direct football which had been engrained into English footballing culture. In fact, Walker’s football was described as ‘too soft’ for the lower leagues in his previous job at fourth tier Colchester, where he was subsequently sacked. The Premier League wasn’t to know that Walker’s forward thinking and possession-based football was way ahead of his time, and the underdogs of Norwich City reaped those rewards.
The pre-season pessimism surrounding Norwich was justified by the first half performance at title favourites Arsenal on the first day of the season, where they trailed 2-0 at the break. However, the introduction of new signing Robins led to a remarkable recovery as Norwich put on a blistering display of attacking football by scoring four past the Gunners in the space of 13 minutes. Robins scored two of these, including a spectacular lob in a half that encapsulated the laissez-faire approach encouraged by Mike Walker.
Although Norwich had a series of peaks and troughs in an inconsistent season, they topped the table after 10 games, losing only a solitary game. However, the following month led to two huge away losses against Blackburn and Liverpool in which they lost 7-1 and 4-1 respectively. The resurgence of form in November and the subsequent loss of form in December saw Norwich goalless in five games and was indicative of their frantic style of play. Walker threw caution to the wind throughout the season and it was this all-in approach that led to impressive runs of results, but also huge dips in form where their defensive frailties would be exposed. Before the five-game run without scoring, Norwich held an eight-point lead at the top of the league after 18 games played, showing that the team and Walker were a force to be reckoned with.
Norwich’s defiance to lie down in the title race was underpinned by their reaction to their December slide. In fact, the reaction was so emphatic that the 1-0 win over title rivals at Aston Villa at the end of the March put Norwich top of the league once more with only six games remaining. This run from January onwards included seven wins in 13 matches, with a belief growing that maybe Norwich were capable of the unthinkable. Next up was second placed Manchester United in a game that highlighted the limitations of this team. It was a game that revealed they weren’t quite good enough to sustain their position at the top, ahead of their North West rivals.
Walker’s philosophy was based on possession football and a high line to push the team further up the pitch in order to sustain meaningful attacks. However, Ferguson counteracted this with a staggering display of counter-attacking football where United blitzed Norwich with three goals in the space of eight minutes. United employed the tactic of allowing Norwich possession of the ball, which pushed them further up the pitch, but in turn left gaping spaces in behind their defence. Ferguson’s United exploited this through direct and fast football to attack the space left by Norwich which overwhelmed their high line. United captain Steve Bruce was ecstatic with United’s performance stating that ‘we were a good counter attacking side, but our performance exceeded our own expectations.’ United ran out 3-1 winners and had proved too much for Norwich, underlying flaws in Walker’s system when put up against a side with so much pace and counter attacking prowess. Heavy defeats at Tottenham and Ipswich in the next three games left Walker fearing the possibility of not qualifying for Europe. However, four points from their last two games ensured they secured third and UEFA cup qualification on the last day of the season. This was a magnificent achievement for the relegation favourites who had also endured a turbulent preseason.
In terms of tactics, Mike Walker’s style of play was extremely forward thinking and some of the principles he taught still have relevance in today’s game. Although the 4-4-2 formation was commonplace in the English game, Walker placed an emphasis on the advanced positioning of the full backs to provide extra width and attacking flair. In addition to this, they had quick wingers in Ruel Fox and David Phillips which meant Norwich proved to be a handful as they overloaded wide areas. In midfield, Walker utilised the ‘ultimate lover/fighter’ centre midfield combination with Jeremy Goss and Ian Cook. Ian Cook’s wonderful range of passing, accompanied by Goss’ robust and hard-working traits led to an extremely functional central midfield base to accompany the flair out wide. Most of these supply lines fell to top scorer Mark Robins, who was accompanied by various others in the season, including Rob Newman, Efan Ekoku and Chris Sutton.
The underlying statistics of Norwich’s season depict their flamboyant style of play. In fact, only three teams conceded more than Norwich’s 65 which incredibly led to them finishing the season on a negative goal difference of -4. This can be attributed to the heavy losses at Blackburn and Tottenham but cannot take away from the 61 scored and the excitement they produced in one of the Premier League’s untold underdog stories.
Next season saw the historic victory over Bayern Munich in the UEFA Cup; however, the league form took a hit consequently. Furthermore, Walker was annoyed with the under-investment which even led to winger Phillips leaving for relegated Nottingham Forest. This under investment was perhaps indicative of the direction of the English game where a survival of the fittest attitude led to huge disparities in wealth, meaning that teams like Norwich were never able to flourish consistently without significant investment. As a result of this, Walker left, and Norwich finished in a languid 12th place.
Alongside this, there was uncertainty surrounding the managerial position at the club after Dave Stringer had prematurely resigned at the end of the 1991/1992 season. In a surprising turn of events, Norwich turned to reserve team coach Mike Walker. Walker’s managerial experience was extremely limited, and his style of play seemingly didn’t fit the accepted style of physicality and direct football which had been engrained into English footballing culture. In fact, Walker’s football was described as ‘too soft’ for the lower leagues in his previous job at fourth tier Colchester, where he was subsequently sacked. The Premier League wasn’t to know that Walker’s forward thinking and possession-based football was way ahead of his time, and the underdogs of Norwich City reaped those rewards.
The pre-season pessimism surrounding Norwich was justified by the first half performance at title favourites Arsenal on the first day of the season, where they trailed 2-0 at the break. However, the introduction of new signing Robins led to a remarkable recovery as Norwich put on a blistering display of attacking football by scoring four past the Gunners in the space of 13 minutes. Robins scored two of these, including a spectacular lob in a half that encapsulated the laissez-faire approach encouraged by Mike Walker.
Although Norwich had a series of peaks and troughs in an inconsistent season, they topped the table after 10 games, losing only a solitary game. However, the following month led to two huge away losses against Blackburn and Liverpool in which they lost 7-1 and 4-1 respectively. The resurgence of form in November and the subsequent loss of form in December saw Norwich goalless in five games and was indicative of their frantic style of play. Walker threw caution to the wind throughout the season and it was this all-in approach that led to impressive runs of results, but also huge dips in form where their defensive frailties would be exposed. Before the five-game run without scoring, Norwich held an eight-point lead at the top of the league after 18 games played, showing that the team and Walker were a force to be reckoned with.
Norwich’s defiance to lie down in the title race was underpinned by their reaction to their December slide. In fact, the reaction was so emphatic that the 1-0 win over title rivals at Aston Villa at the end of the March put Norwich top of the league once more with only six games remaining. This run from January onwards included seven wins in 13 matches, with a belief growing that maybe Norwich were capable of the unthinkable. Next up was second placed Manchester United in a game that highlighted the limitations of this team. It was a game that revealed they weren’t quite good enough to sustain their position at the top, ahead of their North West rivals.
Walker’s philosophy was based on possession football and a high line to push the team further up the pitch in order to sustain meaningful attacks. However, Ferguson counteracted this with a staggering display of counter-attacking football where United blitzed Norwich with three goals in the space of eight minutes. United employed the tactic of allowing Norwich possession of the ball, which pushed them further up the pitch, but in turn left gaping spaces in behind their defence. Ferguson’s United exploited this through direct and fast football to attack the space left by Norwich which overwhelmed their high line. United captain Steve Bruce was ecstatic with United’s performance stating that ‘we were a good counter attacking side, but our performance exceeded our own expectations.’ United ran out 3-1 winners and had proved too much for Norwich, underlying flaws in Walker’s system when put up against a side with so much pace and counter attacking prowess. Heavy defeats at Tottenham and Ipswich in the next three games left Walker fearing the possibility of not qualifying for Europe. However, four points from their last two games ensured they secured third and UEFA cup qualification on the last day of the season. This was a magnificent achievement for the relegation favourites who had also endured a turbulent preseason.
In terms of tactics, Mike Walker’s style of play was extremely forward thinking and some of the principles he taught still have relevance in today’s game. Although the 4-4-2 formation was commonplace in the English game, Walker placed an emphasis on the advanced positioning of the full backs to provide extra width and attacking flair. In addition to this, they had quick wingers in Ruel Fox and David Phillips which meant Norwich proved to be a handful as they overloaded wide areas. In midfield, Walker utilised the ‘ultimate lover/fighter’ centre midfield combination with Jeremy Goss and Ian Cook. Ian Cook’s wonderful range of passing, accompanied by Goss’ robust and hard-working traits led to an extremely functional central midfield base to accompany the flair out wide. Most of these supply lines fell to top scorer Mark Robins, who was accompanied by various others in the season, including Rob Newman, Efan Ekoku and Chris Sutton.
The underlying statistics of Norwich’s season depict their flamboyant style of play. In fact, only three teams conceded more than Norwich’s 65 which incredibly led to them finishing the season on a negative goal difference of -4. This can be attributed to the heavy losses at Blackburn and Tottenham but cannot take away from the 61 scored and the excitement they produced in one of the Premier League’s untold underdog stories.
Next season saw the historic victory over Bayern Munich in the UEFA Cup; however, the league form took a hit consequently. Furthermore, Walker was annoyed with the under-investment which even led to winger Phillips leaving for relegated Nottingham Forest. This under investment was perhaps indicative of the direction of the English game where a survival of the fittest attitude led to huge disparities in wealth, meaning that teams like Norwich were never able to flourish consistently without significant investment. As a result of this, Walker left, and Norwich finished in a languid 12th place.
Mark Robins celebrates scoring his second against Arsenal on the first day of the season.
Leeds United 2000/01
The 1999/00 season saw Leeds assert their dominance domestically and continentally. Alongside a UEFA Cup semi-final, they finished third in the league and did not drop below fourth from the 11th September. They were also top at Christmas, but sadly defeats at the hands of the traditional Premier League giants, Arsenal and Manchester United, and other sloppy results limited their finishing position. Despite the disappointment, Leeds fans had a lot to be optimistic about heading into the 2000/01 season. In his first full season in charge, David O’Leary had delivered Champions League football to Elland Road with his young squad. They had followed their fourth-place finish in 1998/99 with a third-place finish, so, with a handsome budget, youthful legs and a passionate manager, the only way was up for Leeds United.
Leeds spent big in the summer of 2000. They broke their club record transfer fee on midfielder Olivier Dacourt who signed from Lens for over £7m. The big names of Mark Viduka and Dominic Matteo also signed for them. Having shifted some deadweight too, it was no surprise that Leeds were favoured to win their first Premier League title. Despite injury problems before the season begun, two wins form their first two and three goals from Alan Smith suggested that Leeds desired to continue in the same vein as last season. However, only three wins from their next ten left Leeds 10th in the middle of November. The injuries continued as the young squad grew ever-more fatigued as a result of the Champions League group stage. Their league performances suffered and United found themselves 12th on Christmas Day.
It wasn’t all doom and gloom for O’Leary’s men though. Despite a 4-0 defeat at the Nou Camp on Champions League matchday one, they won their next two against AC Milan and Besiktas and ultimately qualified for the second group stage in the competition. They ruthlessly put six past Besiktas at Elland Road, with Viduka and Matteo both getting on the scoresheet. Results like this (and their 4-3 win against Liverpool on November 4th in which Viduka scored four) proved what Leeds could do, but with injuries and tired legs, doing so consistently was very difficult.
In the winter transfer window, Leeds spent big again. They broke their transfer record for a second time in order to sign Rio Ferdinand in November (the fee of £18m is still a club record). Robbie Keane also joined on loan and went on to score nine league goals in the second half of the season. With players returning to fitness and huge new signings, Leeds sought to make a late charge for some silverware.
After an unsuccessful experimentation with a 3-5-2 formation, O’Leary brought solidity and drive back to his side in the second half of the season via the use of his trusted 4-4-2. Despite being a common formation at the time, what made Leeds stand out was that O’Leary was keen to push up his full-backs. Ian Harte scored seven goals in the league – their fifth most of any player. Not only were the full-backs wide options to keep attacks flowing, they were encouraged to go beyond their respective wingers and drive into the box. An ability to overload the wide areas resulted in more balls being put into the penalty area, testing opposition defences. This style of attack perfectly suited the strikers of Leeds: Alan Smith, Mark Viduka and Robbie Keane were all adept finishers at close range. Viduka would often share the strike partnership with one of the two, but any combination of the three would play as if they had been doing so together for years. The way they found space in order to be picked out from the wide areas or by maestro Lee Bowyer (who enjoyed personally his best performing season in 00/01) could devastate opposition defences.
Nigel Martyn was a brilliant shot-stopper, and with Ferdinand in the defence too, who could be partnered with Woodgate or Rabede, Leeds enjoyed significant periods of continuous defensive solidity. Despite conceding 43 goals altogether, in the season’s final 19 games, they only conceded more than one three times.
In the second half of the season, Leeds won 13 out of 19 and charged up the table. The 4-0 win away at Manchester City seemed to mark a turned corner in the league, and back-to-back wins against Anderlecht in the second group stage of the Champions League guaranteed their qualification for the quarter final. Key players David Batty and Harry Kewell had returned to fitness, meaning that Leeds were ever more solid and consistent.
Subsequent to Christmas, the Leeds United players displayed their confidence with their performances in both the Premier League and Champions League. Ian Harte recalled in an interview: “that group of players, with the support of the fans and the city behind us, no matter who we played at Elland Road, we felt like we were going to go out there and win.” O’Leary must be credited with the spirit and belief he injected into the squad. Midfielder Eirik Bakke made 29 league appearances in 2000/01, and despite conceding that other teams may have more quality, he believed that the teams spirit Leeds had was “second to none. It was in the Leeds culture. The heart has to be outside of the shirt.” This was a group of players who loved playing at Elland Road and loved playing under O’Leary. When spirit of this kind is displayed so often, it is puzzling how Leeds in these glorious few years of their history remained trophyless.
Leeds were 12th in late-January, but then a run of 13 matches unbeaten meant that they found themselves in 3rd place by the end of April. They also progressed to the semi-final of the Champions League after a 3-2 aggregate win against last seasons’ Spanish champions Deporitvo La Coruna. However, on the 2nd May, Leeds drew 0-0 against Valencia in the first leg of their semi-final. On the 5th May, they lost 2-1 to Arsenal at Highbury (ending the aforementioned unbeaten streak), and on the 8th May they lost 3-0 to Valencia at the Mestalla. In the space of a week, the resurgent Leeds had been knocked out of the Champions League, and had a fourth place Premier League finish all but solidified. Their season had died a harsh death. Despite their last two games of the season being won by an aggregate score of 9-2, it was a bitter end to the season for Leeds, who had managed to turn it around in winter. They missed out on third place by one point, meaning that Champions League qualification for the 2001/02 season had evaded Leeds.
It would turn out that financial mismanagement would result in this exciting blend of talented youngsters and highly-priced superstars having to be sold off. This would ultimately lead to the downfall of the club in future seasons. They were relegated three seasons later, and Leeds United were a third-tier club by the 2007/08 season. Their financial gamble had not paid off, and following the end of the 2000/01 season, the downturn of Leeds United had been put into motion.
Leeds spent big in the summer of 2000. They broke their club record transfer fee on midfielder Olivier Dacourt who signed from Lens for over £7m. The big names of Mark Viduka and Dominic Matteo also signed for them. Having shifted some deadweight too, it was no surprise that Leeds were favoured to win their first Premier League title. Despite injury problems before the season begun, two wins form their first two and three goals from Alan Smith suggested that Leeds desired to continue in the same vein as last season. However, only three wins from their next ten left Leeds 10th in the middle of November. The injuries continued as the young squad grew ever-more fatigued as a result of the Champions League group stage. Their league performances suffered and United found themselves 12th on Christmas Day.
It wasn’t all doom and gloom for O’Leary’s men though. Despite a 4-0 defeat at the Nou Camp on Champions League matchday one, they won their next two against AC Milan and Besiktas and ultimately qualified for the second group stage in the competition. They ruthlessly put six past Besiktas at Elland Road, with Viduka and Matteo both getting on the scoresheet. Results like this (and their 4-3 win against Liverpool on November 4th in which Viduka scored four) proved what Leeds could do, but with injuries and tired legs, doing so consistently was very difficult.
In the winter transfer window, Leeds spent big again. They broke their transfer record for a second time in order to sign Rio Ferdinand in November (the fee of £18m is still a club record). Robbie Keane also joined on loan and went on to score nine league goals in the second half of the season. With players returning to fitness and huge new signings, Leeds sought to make a late charge for some silverware.
After an unsuccessful experimentation with a 3-5-2 formation, O’Leary brought solidity and drive back to his side in the second half of the season via the use of his trusted 4-4-2. Despite being a common formation at the time, what made Leeds stand out was that O’Leary was keen to push up his full-backs. Ian Harte scored seven goals in the league – their fifth most of any player. Not only were the full-backs wide options to keep attacks flowing, they were encouraged to go beyond their respective wingers and drive into the box. An ability to overload the wide areas resulted in more balls being put into the penalty area, testing opposition defences. This style of attack perfectly suited the strikers of Leeds: Alan Smith, Mark Viduka and Robbie Keane were all adept finishers at close range. Viduka would often share the strike partnership with one of the two, but any combination of the three would play as if they had been doing so together for years. The way they found space in order to be picked out from the wide areas or by maestro Lee Bowyer (who enjoyed personally his best performing season in 00/01) could devastate opposition defences.
Nigel Martyn was a brilliant shot-stopper, and with Ferdinand in the defence too, who could be partnered with Woodgate or Rabede, Leeds enjoyed significant periods of continuous defensive solidity. Despite conceding 43 goals altogether, in the season’s final 19 games, they only conceded more than one three times.
In the second half of the season, Leeds won 13 out of 19 and charged up the table. The 4-0 win away at Manchester City seemed to mark a turned corner in the league, and back-to-back wins against Anderlecht in the second group stage of the Champions League guaranteed their qualification for the quarter final. Key players David Batty and Harry Kewell had returned to fitness, meaning that Leeds were ever more solid and consistent.
Subsequent to Christmas, the Leeds United players displayed their confidence with their performances in both the Premier League and Champions League. Ian Harte recalled in an interview: “that group of players, with the support of the fans and the city behind us, no matter who we played at Elland Road, we felt like we were going to go out there and win.” O’Leary must be credited with the spirit and belief he injected into the squad. Midfielder Eirik Bakke made 29 league appearances in 2000/01, and despite conceding that other teams may have more quality, he believed that the teams spirit Leeds had was “second to none. It was in the Leeds culture. The heart has to be outside of the shirt.” This was a group of players who loved playing at Elland Road and loved playing under O’Leary. When spirit of this kind is displayed so often, it is puzzling how Leeds in these glorious few years of their history remained trophyless.
Leeds were 12th in late-January, but then a run of 13 matches unbeaten meant that they found themselves in 3rd place by the end of April. They also progressed to the semi-final of the Champions League after a 3-2 aggregate win against last seasons’ Spanish champions Deporitvo La Coruna. However, on the 2nd May, Leeds drew 0-0 against Valencia in the first leg of their semi-final. On the 5th May, they lost 2-1 to Arsenal at Highbury (ending the aforementioned unbeaten streak), and on the 8th May they lost 3-0 to Valencia at the Mestalla. In the space of a week, the resurgent Leeds had been knocked out of the Champions League, and had a fourth place Premier League finish all but solidified. Their season had died a harsh death. Despite their last two games of the season being won by an aggregate score of 9-2, it was a bitter end to the season for Leeds, who had managed to turn it around in winter. They missed out on third place by one point, meaning that Champions League qualification for the 2001/02 season had evaded Leeds.
It would turn out that financial mismanagement would result in this exciting blend of talented youngsters and highly-priced superstars having to be sold off. This would ultimately lead to the downfall of the club in future seasons. They were relegated three seasons later, and Leeds United were a third-tier club by the 2007/08 season. Their financial gamble had not paid off, and following the end of the 2000/01 season, the downturn of Leeds United had been put into motion.
The Leeds starting XI pose for a photo prior to their Champions League semi-final first leg
Tottenham Hotspur 2016/17
The 2016/17 season was Tottenham’s last at White Hart Lane and was arguably their best Premier League campaign. Amassing a brilliant 86 points and fantastic spells – including one run of nine straight wins, it was Spurs’ inability to grind out wins and an early blip in form which ultimately led to them falling short of Antonio Conte’s record-breaking Chelsea.
Popular manager Mauricio Pochettino continued to implement his 4-2-3-1 pressing mentality that his Spurs team had become accustomed to playing to and going forward it paid off magnificently. Spurs were the top scorers in the league, with Harry Kane alone scoring 29 league goals (in just 30 games) to take home the Golden Boot. This scintillating attacking prowess is best exemplified with the final two games of the season. Spurs played the previous season’s champions (Leicester City) at the King Power Stadium and dispatched six goals past a helpless Kasper Schmeichel in a 6-1 victory, before travelling to Hull and going one better in a 7-1 win.
Perhaps Spurs’ failure to win the league is best summarised in their first 12 games. Despite going unbeaten, they had only won half of these opening fixtures, even going on a run of four back-to-back draws. A key factor of these draws could be the missing Harry Kane, who picked up an injury against Sunderland. In his five games missing, three of the four consecutive draws took place. On his return, a North London derby against eternal foe Arsenal, it was his penalty that salvaged a point in a 1-1 draw. It would be these stalemates that would cost Spurs, a team struggling to nick wins without their leading marksman, a team who struggled to win ugly.
Kane’s understudy was summer signing Vincent Janssen, a £17m investment from AZ Alkmaar. In his one season at AZ, Janssen had won the Eredivisie Golden Boot with 27 goals and been awarded the 2016 Johann Cruyff Trophy (Dutch Footballer of the Year). Unfortunately, he struggled to adapt to English football and repaid little of his hefty fee – just two league goals all season. Other signings included Victor Wanyama and Moussa Sissoko – both brought in to add depth and quality to a threadbare midfield. The latter would be criticised for inconsistency, despite showing glimpses of quality. Furthermore, Georges-Kévin Nkoudou struggled to make any impact in the side at all – with a meagre eight substitute appearances on his season statistics.
Instead, the trio Pochettino opted to play behind the sole striker consisted of Dele Alli, Christian Eriksen and Son-Heung Min. Between them they managed a staggering 40 league goals. This remarkable achievement highlights the difficulty for Nkoudou to break into the favoured XI.
Spurs were, however, unable to knock Chelsea off top spot – a place they had held since early November. Conte’s counter-attacking system was, at times, unstoppable. The Blues managed to win 13 consecutive games between the 1st October until the end of December. This run included six consecutive clean sheets and three consecutive 1-0 nail-biters. Chelsea had become adept at winning ugly. Even when they failed to play well, the team still won. Natural finisher Diego Costa was supplied chances by the likes of Willian, Pedro and an exceptional Eden Hazard. The astute signing of N’Golo Kanté saw him win back-to-back Premier League titles with two separate clubs, as he added an efficient engine to compliment the stoic Nemanja Matic and playmaking Cesc Fàbregas.
Ultimately, the record-breaking 13-game win streak is why Chelsea won the league. The gap at the top of the table had become unreachable. Even when Spurs went on a magnificent spell of their own, notching nine straight victories, they could only drag Chelsea to just four points clear with four games to play. At this point – the crux of the season – it would be Spurs who faltered. They fell one short of ten straight victories away to rivals West Ham, losing 1-0 and scuppering any chances of bringing a Premier League title to White Hart Lane.
Chelsea’s run would be ended by Spurs, Dele Alli scoring both goals in a 2-0 victory. At that point, Tottenham were thirteen points behind leaders Chelsea and although they were six unbeaten themselves, could only imagine of chasing down Conte’s side and stretching the title race for as long as they did. That attitude, that resilience, and that determination has to be applauded. Unfortunately, it was too little, too late.
An unbeaten season at White Hart Lane, a Golden Boot award and scintillating football under an emphatic manager, Spurs fans will look back and wonder at what might’ve been. Losing three games all season, but still finishing seven points behind Chelsea only serves the argument that Chelsea were just too good. The season previous, 86 points would have won the league. It would be difficult to argue that any team, in any season, who only lose three games and go on a nine-game winning streak is undeserving of a title. For Spurs, however, they fell short. A Premier League title evaded White Hart Lane and any trophy would evade Pochettino at Tottenham. The final season before the dominance of Manchester City and Liverpool belonged in London, but over 10 miles south of White Hart Lane.
Popular manager Mauricio Pochettino continued to implement his 4-2-3-1 pressing mentality that his Spurs team had become accustomed to playing to and going forward it paid off magnificently. Spurs were the top scorers in the league, with Harry Kane alone scoring 29 league goals (in just 30 games) to take home the Golden Boot. This scintillating attacking prowess is best exemplified with the final two games of the season. Spurs played the previous season’s champions (Leicester City) at the King Power Stadium and dispatched six goals past a helpless Kasper Schmeichel in a 6-1 victory, before travelling to Hull and going one better in a 7-1 win.
Perhaps Spurs’ failure to win the league is best summarised in their first 12 games. Despite going unbeaten, they had only won half of these opening fixtures, even going on a run of four back-to-back draws. A key factor of these draws could be the missing Harry Kane, who picked up an injury against Sunderland. In his five games missing, three of the four consecutive draws took place. On his return, a North London derby against eternal foe Arsenal, it was his penalty that salvaged a point in a 1-1 draw. It would be these stalemates that would cost Spurs, a team struggling to nick wins without their leading marksman, a team who struggled to win ugly.
Kane’s understudy was summer signing Vincent Janssen, a £17m investment from AZ Alkmaar. In his one season at AZ, Janssen had won the Eredivisie Golden Boot with 27 goals and been awarded the 2016 Johann Cruyff Trophy (Dutch Footballer of the Year). Unfortunately, he struggled to adapt to English football and repaid little of his hefty fee – just two league goals all season. Other signings included Victor Wanyama and Moussa Sissoko – both brought in to add depth and quality to a threadbare midfield. The latter would be criticised for inconsistency, despite showing glimpses of quality. Furthermore, Georges-Kévin Nkoudou struggled to make any impact in the side at all – with a meagre eight substitute appearances on his season statistics.
Instead, the trio Pochettino opted to play behind the sole striker consisted of Dele Alli, Christian Eriksen and Son-Heung Min. Between them they managed a staggering 40 league goals. This remarkable achievement highlights the difficulty for Nkoudou to break into the favoured XI.
Spurs were, however, unable to knock Chelsea off top spot – a place they had held since early November. Conte’s counter-attacking system was, at times, unstoppable. The Blues managed to win 13 consecutive games between the 1st October until the end of December. This run included six consecutive clean sheets and three consecutive 1-0 nail-biters. Chelsea had become adept at winning ugly. Even when they failed to play well, the team still won. Natural finisher Diego Costa was supplied chances by the likes of Willian, Pedro and an exceptional Eden Hazard. The astute signing of N’Golo Kanté saw him win back-to-back Premier League titles with two separate clubs, as he added an efficient engine to compliment the stoic Nemanja Matic and playmaking Cesc Fàbregas.
Ultimately, the record-breaking 13-game win streak is why Chelsea won the league. The gap at the top of the table had become unreachable. Even when Spurs went on a magnificent spell of their own, notching nine straight victories, they could only drag Chelsea to just four points clear with four games to play. At this point – the crux of the season – it would be Spurs who faltered. They fell one short of ten straight victories away to rivals West Ham, losing 1-0 and scuppering any chances of bringing a Premier League title to White Hart Lane.
Chelsea’s run would be ended by Spurs, Dele Alli scoring both goals in a 2-0 victory. At that point, Tottenham were thirteen points behind leaders Chelsea and although they were six unbeaten themselves, could only imagine of chasing down Conte’s side and stretching the title race for as long as they did. That attitude, that resilience, and that determination has to be applauded. Unfortunately, it was too little, too late.
An unbeaten season at White Hart Lane, a Golden Boot award and scintillating football under an emphatic manager, Spurs fans will look back and wonder at what might’ve been. Losing three games all season, but still finishing seven points behind Chelsea only serves the argument that Chelsea were just too good. The season previous, 86 points would have won the league. It would be difficult to argue that any team, in any season, who only lose three games and go on a nine-game winning streak is undeserving of a title. For Spurs, however, they fell short. A Premier League title evaded White Hart Lane and any trophy would evade Pochettino at Tottenham. The final season before the dominance of Manchester City and Liverpool belonged in London, but over 10 miles south of White Hart Lane.
Harry Kane celebrates scoring the opener at the Emirates in November